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Abstract
This paper examines the eﬀect of changes on corporate governance levels on the choice
of ﬁrms’ debt ﬁnancing, taking advantage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a natural experiment.
Further our paper analyzes a speciﬁcb e n e ﬁt of SOX on terms of debt ﬁnance in a credit
rationing environment. Our empirical methodology uses an experiment-like design in which
we control for observed and unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity via a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
matching estimator. We evidence that ﬁrms subjected to this new regulation, that raised
the governance requirements, observe a positive eﬀect on their access to the credit market,
increasing their debt level signiﬁcantly, and reducing the cost of debt, evidencing an economic
gains from SOX.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A major issue about corporate ﬁnance research is the endogenous relation between corporate
governance, ﬁrms’ wiliness to borrow and interest rates. Intuitively, better corporate governance
schemes decrease information asymmetry, alleviating moral hazard problem and improving the
terms of credit. On the other hand, debt can work as a discipline mechanism inducing managers
to: i) better allocate of free cash ﬂows, ii) higher self-eﬀort, iii) contingent control allocation.1
Therefore, it is diﬃcult to identify a causal link going from corporate governance to ﬁrms’ debt
ﬁnancing decisions.
After the failures of Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia and others, academics, politicians and the press
have discussed about the corporate governance quality.2 These huge bankruptcies have boosted
a legislative reform — called The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (henceforth SOX) — to improve governance
schemes. Also, the debate at the media pointed to an increasing attention of corporations on
governance issues.3
Coates (2007) states that despite the higher costs created by this new lagislation on internal
controls, Sarbanes-Oxley promises a variety of long-term beneﬁts since investors face a lower risk of
losses from fraud and theft, and beneﬁt from more reliable ﬁnancial reporting, greater transparenvy
1See Jensen and Meckling (1976), Zwiebel (1995), Innes (1990) and Aghion and placeBolton (1992).
2See for example “After 10 Years, Corporate Oversight Is Still Dismal” (The New York Times, 01/26/2003)
3See for example “After High-Proﬁle Corporate Busts, Governance Consulting Booms” (The Washington Post,
12/27/2002).
1and accountability. As one of its potential results, public companies would pay a lower cost of
capital. On the other hand, the Study of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Section 404 Internal
Control over Financial Reporting Requirements from SEC (2009) reports the following: “Nonethe-
less, the evidence suggests that survey participants do not perceive the direct improvements in the
reporting process to aﬀect the companies dealings with capital market participants. For instance,
respondents recognize virtually no eﬀect from Section 404 implementation on companies’ cost of
capital or the ease with which they access capital markets.” Thus, the main contribution of the
present paper is to measure the corporate governance eﬀects from SOX on ﬁrms’ debt ﬁnancing
policy.
Further, our results bring new evidences on a speciﬁcb e n e ﬁto fS O X ,s i n c ew ea r ee x p l o r i n g
the gains of ﬁrms in the terms of credit. Much research has been done focusing on the overall
costs and beneﬁts of SOX. Leuz (2007) points that the main problem in assessing net eﬀects of
SOX is about the diﬃculty to ﬁnd a control group of ﬁr m st h a ti sn o ta ﬀected and comparable to
ﬁrms aﬀected by SOX. This shortcoming makes it diﬃcult to remove market-wide eﬀects that are
unrelated to SOX. In addition, Coates (2007) states that existing studies of SOX are confounded
by the presence of contemporaneus economic and legal events, since the legislation was enacted
amidst sharp ﬁnancial and economic changes. Coates says that "It makes a large number of
simultaneous, disparate legal changes, which continue to be implemented and phased in over time.
. . . Given the corporate scandals of the early 2000s, and the awareness of this behavior by
investors and other market participants, the chances are good that public and private enforcement
and manager behavior would have changed even had Sarbanes-Oxley not been enacted."
To isolate the eﬀect of SOX on debt ﬁnancing policy from the other shocks, we have to ﬁnd a
tratment and control groups that are subjected to the same shocks, except for the SOX implemen-
tation. To do this, we use diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach that accounts for unobservable time
eﬀects. The variation over time and groups provide a potential instrument to identify the causal
eﬀect of better governance as required by SOX over debt variables. Since the new law provides an
exogenous shock on governance requirements to all US public companies and to non-US ﬁrms listed
on levels 2 and 3 ADRs, and it does not apply to foreign companies non-listed or listed at levels 1
or 4 ADRs, the cross-listing make viable the natural experiment, where the treatment group are
those companies subjected to the Act (cross-listed ﬁrms at levels 2 and 3) and the control group
is composed by some companies that are neither subject to the Act (cross-listed ﬁrms at levels 1
and 4) nor exposed to US regulation (no cross-listed ﬁrms).
H o w e v e r ,w h i l ew ea r g u et h a tc r o s s - ﬁrm variation in the terms of debt that comes due right
after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is exogenous, one might wonder if other sources of ﬁrm heterogeneity
could underlie the relations we might observe. To tackle this concern, we use a diﬀerences-in-
diﬀerences matching estimator that incorporates observable ﬁrm characteristics and accounts for
unobservable ﬁrm eﬀects. In this procedure, the speciﬁcation instead of represents a model that try
to fully explains the endogenous variable, it focus on ensuring that variables that might inﬂuence
the selection into tratment and observed outcomes are appropriately accounted in the estimation.
The variation over time and groups provide a potential instrument to identify the causal eﬀect of
better governance as required by SOX over debt variables.
To implement such experiment we use an environment that provides two diﬀerent sets of ﬁrms:
the one that was aﬀected by SOX (called treatment group) and another group that was not aﬀect
by SOX (called control group). To reduce the concerns about selection we match ﬁrms under SOX
requirements (treatment), with control ﬁrms that were not subjected to the new regulation. We
match these groups of ﬁrms based on their ﬁnancial and accounting characteristics such as asset
size, industry sector classiﬁcation; cash holdings; price-to-book ratio; beta; etc. The matching
2process is used to assure that we are comparing very similar ﬁrms except from the fact that
some of them are not subjected to SOX regulation. Also, we account for time invariant ﬁrm
heterogeneity since we compare within-ﬁrm changes in the variable of interest, from the period
that proceeds the reform to the period that follows the reform. Also, we perform falsiﬁcation tests
that replicates our matching estimators in pre-reform period to verify that the result wasn’t only
drove by the time trend.
Under this approach, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) will be our natural experiment used to
test the eﬀect of changes in the level of corporate governance on debt ﬁnance. Since the new law
provides an exogenous shock on governance requirements to all US public companies and to non-US
ﬁrms listed on levels 2 and 3 ADRs, and it does not apply to foreign companies non-listed or listed
at levels 1 or 4 ADRs, the cross-listing make viable the natural experiment, where the treatment
group are those companies subjected to the Act (cross-listed ﬁr m sa tl e v e l s2a n d3 )a n dt h ec o n t r o l
group is composed by some companies that are neither subject to the Act (cross-listed ﬁrms at levels
1 and 4) nor exposed to US regulation (no cross-listed ﬁrms). An inportant issue to be considered
here is how steady is the cross-listing decision, since it may inﬂuence our identiﬁcation strategy.
Under an signiﬁcant increase of costs brought by the SOX, the listing decision is endogenous to
the regulation and therefore they can "Go Dark" after SOX, biasing our estimation. Marosi and
Massoud (2008) argues that foreign ﬁrms ﬁnd deregistration extremely diﬃcult, and usually they
" c a nc h e c ki n ,b u tt h e yc a n ’ tc h e c ko u t " . 4 Leuz et al. (2008) documented a signiﬁcant increase in
the going dark decision, and it was attributable to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
A country where that scenario applies would fulﬁll our experiment requirements. Brazilian ﬁrms
use extensively American Depositary Shares (ADSs) programs,5 implying that part of our sample
is subjected to the SOX regulation. Also, none of the Brazilian ﬁrms cross-listed in the ADR level
23 program deregistrated in the period post-SOX, which allows our identiﬁcation strategy. They
face extremely high level of interest rate spread6 due to poor legal enforcement7 and creditors
protection, which ends at an underdeveloped credit market with severe credit constraints to the
Brazilian ﬁrms. To exemplify it, at 2002 the Brazilian ratio of private credit to GDP was 0.35, while
the average of OECD countries was 1.02 and Latin America and the place Caribbean countries
0.44. Moreover, the Brazilian interest rate spread (49%) is more than four times larger than the
average spread in Latin American countries (11%) and more than twelve times larger than the
average for OECD countries (3.87%).8 So, even with the addition of the SOX costs the cross-listed
credit market "outside option" inhibits their decision to "go dark".
The impact of SOX on ﬁrms has been investigated from various perspectives, but mostly on net
eﬀects of SOX. Kamar et al. (2005), Engel, Hayes and Wang (2007), and Leuz et al. (2008) analyze
the eﬀect of SOX on ﬁrm’s decision of going-private and going-dark. Piotroski and Srinivasan
(2007) examine the economic impact of SOX by analyzing foreign listing behavior onto U.S and
placecountry-regionUK stock exchanges. Several papers use event studies and ﬁnd contradictory
evidence from SOX on ﬁrms returns. Li et al. (2004) and Rezaee and Jain (2005) ﬁnd positive
reactions to SOX while Zhang (2007) ﬁnd negative reactions. Berger et al. (2005), Smith (2007)
4We choose a sample that none of the ﬁrms cross-listed deregistred in the post-SOX period. Brazillian ﬁrms
have this feature.
5According to JP Morgan (www.adr.com). In July 2008 Brazil were in the top three country with cross-listed
ﬁrms in US, just behind UK and Japan.
6According to World Bank WDI database, placecountry-regionBrazil has been one of the leading countries in
interest rates spread during the last 10 years.
7According to Durnev and Kim (2005), only country-regionColombia ranks above country-regionplaceBrazil in
terms of legal enforcement.
8All the values are referent to the 1997-2002 period. Source: World Development Indicators (2004).
3and Litvak (2007) analyze how SOX impacts on cross-listed foreign companies. Berger et al. (2005)
compare returns to cross-listed foreign companies to returns to US issuers. According to Litvak
(2007, p.197) “this lets them evaluate cross-sectional variation in reaction based on home-country
characteristics, but they cannot assess overall investor reaction to SOX, because they lack a control
group of companies to which SOX does not apply”. Smith (2007) adopts an event study approach
to test the impacts from SOX and Litvak (2007) applies a natural experiment approach, controlling
for contemporaneous events through a combination of (i) comparing level-2 and 3 cross-listed to
non-cross-listed ﬁrms, and (ii) comparing level-2 and 3 matched pairs (ﬁrms), to level-1 and 4 pairs
(ﬁrms).
On the speciﬁc costs and beneﬁts of SOX, Eldridge and Kealy (2005) examine the cost of the
new internal control audit required by SOX for a sample of Fortune 1000 companies, Cohen et al.
(2004) study the SOX impact on compensation structure and risk-taking incentives of CEO’s and
Paligorova (2008) investigate the eﬀect on executive compensation.
Our paper contributes the literature by analyzing a speciﬁcb e n e ﬁt (if any) of SOX - iselated
from other contemporaneous events - on the terms of debt ﬁnance, also, this natural experiment
approach gets around the concern that corporate governance and debt are endogenous, and presents
an alternative to instrumental variables techniques.
Our main results show that the ﬁrms aﬀected by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act increase their total
amount of debt of approximately 10% percent more than similar ﬁr m st h a tw e r en o ta ﬀected by
SOX. Moreover, we found that both the long-term debt increase approximately 40%, while no
eﬀect was evidenced in the short-term debt. Finally, we found that the interest rate charged to
ﬁrms reduced approximately 18%, which is consistent to an expected reduction in moral hazard
costs due to the gains in corporate governance.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section II describes the relation
between The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and corporate governance; section III describes the empirica
design; section IV presents the database and the main descriptive statistics; section V presents the
main results that evidence the eﬀect of corporate governance on ﬁrms’ debt ﬁnancing; section VI
concludes.
2 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Corporate Governance
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, also known as the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor
Protection Act, enforce changes that aﬀect executive payment compensation and fraud punish-
ment, board and shareholder monitoring, establishing a new audit board, harsher internal controls
mechanisms, higher responsibility to senior executives and many other speciﬁc issues.9
To be more precise, one provision related to executive payment requires the CEO and CFO to
discharge any proﬁts from bonuses and stock sales during the twelve-month period that follows
a ﬁnancial report that is subsequently restated due “misconduct”. This provision increases their
risk of selling a large amount of stock or options in any one year while still in oﬃce, inducing a
conservative behavior until they are no longer in those positions before selling equity or exercising
options. Also, this requirement will act as a deterrent to negligent or deliberate misreporting.
Therefore, two sources of moral hazard behavior are mitigated with this requirement, ﬁrst the ex
ante eﬀect due to a reduction of negligent/deliberate misreporting actions and second the ex post
eﬀect that inhibits CEOs and CFOs risk investment choices to improve personal gains.
Shareholder-related provisions enhanced ﬁnancial disclosure. SOX requires more detailed
disclosure of oﬀ-balance-sheet ﬁnancings and special purpose entities, which should make it more
9See Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) for more details.
4diﬃcult for companies to manipulate their ﬁnancial statements in a way that boosts the current
stock price. The Act also includes several provisions designed to improve board monitoring. These
focus largely on increasing the power, responsibility, and independence of the audit committee.
SOX requires that the audit committee hire the outside auditor and that the committee consist
entirely of directors with no other ﬁnancial relationship with the company. Such changes in the
monitoring practice increase the chances of some misconduct be identiﬁed, reducing the expected
gains from moral hazard actions.
Finally, the new law increases CEOs, CFOs and the board’s responsibility for ﬁnancial reporting
and the criminal penalties for misreporting. This issue clearly increases their cost of misconduct,
probably inducing less opportunistic behavior. Table N summarizes the set of mandates of SOX.
To sum up, the requirements enforced by SOX induce an improvement in the corporate
governance system since it reduces the potential gains from managers, increases their probability
of being caught and their cost of misconduct.
2.1 A simple model
To analyze the potential eﬀect of the new law on corporate governance, let us consider an asymmetric-
information problem with regard to the level of eﬀort and fraud that managers — that run debt
ﬁnancing ﬁrms — choose when they pursue projects. Since creditors do not observe the variable
eﬀort and fraud, they are not able to know whether a borrowing ﬁrm chose the optimal eﬀort level.
The manager may allocate their time in eﬀo r t(e)t op u r s u et h ep r o j e c ts u c c e s sa n df r a u d(f)
to deviate, somehow, gains of the project for himself. Thus, their time is divided by e + f that is
equal to the time spent in the ﬁr má( á=e+f) .T h em a n a g e r ’ sd e c i s i o no ne ﬀort and fraud aﬀect
t h ec h a n c eo fb ec a u g h ta n dt h es u c c e s so fﬁrm’s investment. We assume that the probability of
success of the investment project increases with the manager’s eﬀort level. In precise terms, we
assume that the probability of the ﬁrm be solvent (p solv(e)) is diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing,





5meaning that is eﬃcient for the ﬁrm to choose a positive eﬀort level and that psolv(α) < 1 for the
insolvency state be always possible. Also, since there is a chance of manager be caught, we assume
that this probability increases with manager’s fraud level ( f ) and the monitoring level (M ). In
precise terms, the probability of the manager be caught ( q(f,M))i sd i ﬀerentiable and strictly
i n c r e a s i n gi nt h ef r a u d(f)a n dm o n i t o r i n gv a r i a b l e(M),a n dt h a tq(f,M)<1 for the fraud not
be discovered be always possible.
The manager gains from fraud are positive function of the level of fraud G( f ) and its cost ( Cf )
is the punishment imposed by the legislation. The dynamics of this problem is illustrated by the
ﬁgure 1. The ﬁgure represents the managers expected return as function of his choice on fraud
and eﬀort. The ﬁrm can succeed and be solvent, providing a return of V. After the payment to
creditors F (debt face value) the value that remains for the manager is V — F. If the manager
commits fraud and he is not caught he adds the gains of fraud ( V −F +Fraud Gains), otherwise,
if he is caught, he receives a punishment (Cf ). The ﬁr mc a ng ot ob a n k r u p t c y ,p r o v i d i n gar e t u r n
of zero for managers and v for creditors (where v < F). If the manager commits fraud and if
he is not caught, his gains comes only from fraud (Fraud Gains), otherwise, if he is caught, the
punishment is applied (Cf ).
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E(W)= p(e)[q(f,M)(−Cf)+( 1− q(f,M))(V − F + G(f))]+
(1 − p(e))[q(f,M)(−Cf)+( 1− q(f,M))(G(f))
s.t. α =e + f
The problem can be simpliﬁed and re-written as:
max
f
E(W)=p(α − f)(1 − q(f,M))(V − F)+( 1− q(f,M))G(f) − q(f,M)Cf
The manager exerts fraud until its marginal gain be equal to its marginal cost. The optimal level of
fraud is function of gains from solvency, gains from fraud, level of monitoring, level of punishment,
etc. Thus we can write the optimal choice of fraud as
f
∗ = f(V − F,α,G(·),M,C f).
Notice that the last two exogenous variables (M and Cf) are directly aﬀected by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. So, the question that we address to answer is: How an increase in the monitoring level
(M) and punishment for fraud ( Cf)m a ya ﬀect managers decision on fraud and eﬀort on ﬁrms`
projects? To see the eﬀect lets take the manager`s expected wealth and divide in three parts:
1) Beneﬁtf r o ms o l v e n c y :
p(α − f)(1 − q(f,M))(V − F)
2)Beneﬁtf r o mn o tb ec a u g h t :
(1 − q(f,M))G(f)
3) Cost of Fraud:
q(f,M)Cf
Suppose that the monitoring level increases from M to M’, where M’>M. In this case, for a
higher monitoring level, the level of fraud (f ) has a stronger eﬀect on the probability of being
caught, increasing q(f,M) and as consequence reducing the marginal beneﬁt sf r o mf r a u di ns o l -
vency states and from states which manager is not discovered (1 and 2 respectively). Also, it
increases the marginal cost of fraud, since it increases its expected cost (3). Therefore, since a
higher level of monitoring reduces the marginal beneﬁt from fraud and increases its marginal cost,








In this case, there is no change in the beneﬁt( 1a n d2 ) ,h o w e v e r ,i ti n c r e a s e st h em a r g i n a lc o s to f




Therefore, once we observe a fall at fraud level, more time will be expended for eﬀort on ﬁrms’
projects (since α = e + f), reducing the moral hazard problem.
Proposition 1 An increase in the Monitoring level (M) reduces the moral hazard problem.
Proposition 2 An increase in the cost of fraud (Cf ) reduces the moral hazard problem.
With a reduction in the fraud level (f ), the time allocated by the manager on eﬀort for ﬁrm’s
project increase (e), making more possible the solvent state of nature (it increases p(e) ) and less
possible the insolvency. This eﬀect reduces the risk of lending of the creditors, making the terms
of credit better to the ﬁrms and, as consequence, motivating the ﬁrms’ debt ﬁnancing.
3 Empirical Design
In this section we will describe our experiment and the matching diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence method
used in the paper.
3.1 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act as an Experiment
The basic idea of exploiting the implementation of SOX regulation is that it provides a way to
identify the eﬀect of changes at corporate governance on ﬁrms’ debt ﬁnancing policy.
As stated by Modigliani-Miller model of frictionless capital market, the ﬁnancing policy is
i r r e l e v a n ts i n c ei td o e sn o th a v ea n ye ﬀect on ﬁrms’ value. However, it is only true under several
hypothesis, including the non existence of asymmetric information, i. e., there is no corporate
governance problems in their economy.
Lately, problems related to corporate governance has been a recurrent topic of researchers
agenda, mostly due to the recent ﬁnancial scandals. Therefore, in the presence of corporate
governance problems, the relevance of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial policy increases.
The problem to deal with the relation between corporate governance and the debt ﬁnancing
is their endogenous relation. To approach this issue, our identiﬁcation strategy requires that
the governance level has to be enough variation to allow comparison accross ﬁrms. Also, the
variation of the corporate governance level needs to be exogenous and independent from the ﬁrms’
ﬁnancing policy. The SOX represents this exogenous shock on the corporate governance level that
is independent from ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing policy.
The major problem concerning the use of SOX as an experiment is the fact that is diﬃcult to
disentangle its eﬀects from other shocks occuring simultaneously the ﬁnancial and economic ﬁeld.
The legislation was enacted amidst sharp ﬁnancial, economic, and political changes.
To isolate the eﬀect of SOX on debt ﬁnancing policy from the other shocks, we have to ﬁnd
a tratment and control groups that are subjected to the same shocks, except for the SOX im-
plementation. Since the new law provides an exogenous shock on governance requirements to all
non-US ﬁrms listed on levels 2 and 3 ADRs (treatment group), and it does not apply to foreign
companies non-listed or listed at levels 1 or 4 ADRs, the cross-listing make viable the natural ex-
periment (non-treatment group). Then, to minimize the concerns about selection we use matching
estimation techniques to build our control group selected from the non-treatment group, ensuring
that variables that might inﬂuence the selection into tratment are appropriately accounted into
the estimation. Finally, we have to consider in the model the cross-listing decision, since it may
8inﬂuence our identiﬁcation strategy. The listing decision is endogenous to changes in regulation
and therefore it can produce a bias in our estimation. With the adoption of SOX, the costs of
cross-listing increases inducing ﬁrms to "go dark".10 Using data on Brazilian ﬁrms we can avoid
this estimation problem since they use extensively American Depositary Shares (ADSs) programs
- implying that part of our sample is subjected to the SOX regulation - and none of the cross-listed
in the ADR level 23 program deregistrated in the period post-SOX, which allows our identiﬁcation
strategy.
3.2 Matching Diﬀence-in-Diﬀerence Estimators (MDID)
We want to test wether ﬁrms had their decision on debt ﬁnancing policy altered afeter the SOX
be in force. Our objective is to develop an identiﬁcation strategy that represents a "random"
experiment, that is, any brazilian publicly traded ﬁrm had a positive chance to be regulated by
the SOX. If one believe that the shock on corporate governance level was truly randomly assigned
accross ﬁrms, then it would be suﬃce to compare the ex-post terms of credit of ﬁrms that were
aﬀected by SOX with those not aﬀected by the law.
O u ra n a l y s i s ,h o w e v e r ,n e e d st oa l l o wt h ef a c tt h a tw ea r en o ti nat r u er a n d o m l ye x p e r i m e n t ,
since there is some ﬁrms ’ characteristics correlated with the exogenous shock, for example, the
ﬁrms subjected to SOX are those that join the ADS program. In the absence of a controlled
randomized trial, we are forced to turn to non-experimental methods that mimic it under reasonable
conditions.
Since we are interested to quantify the impact of changes in the corporate governance level on
terms of credit, we need carefully identify a group of ﬁrms that are virtually similar to those that
suﬀered a change in their corporate governance except for the fact that they do not suﬀered this
shock. That is, we need to pin down the counterfactual ﬁrm ﬁnancing policy in the period of SOX
because it would represent the ﬁnancing policy of the ﬁrms if they did not suﬀer the changes in
the corporate governance level.
A commom approach to this problem is running an OLS regression that separates the treatment
and control groups via an indicator variable. The eﬀect of the treatment is measured by the
coeﬃcient of the variable indicator. Some control variables as asset size, proﬁtability, risk, etc
are usally added to capture some heterogeneity. However, the OLS procedure may introduce
few problems. First, the OLS allows for the extreme outliers in the estimation that can bias the
estimates of interest. Second, the introduction of control variables in the model doesn’t address for
the diﬀerent distributions between groups in the control variables, and this feature may turn the
control variables ineﬀective. Finally, since the OLS procedure imposes a linear speciﬁcation, the
estimation of group diﬀerences may be improved allowing for non-linear modeling of the variables
of interest.
The matching estimators used in this paper is less related to OLS method and more closed
to the idea of a randomized experiment. This method isolates treated observations - in this case
ﬁrms subjected to SOX - and then, from a non-treated observations, search for control that best
match the treated observations in several dimensions, called covariates, i.e., their characteristics
are the closest to the treated ones.
In this procedure, the set of counterfactuals are represented by the matched controls, or in
other words, it means that we assume that the treated group would have behaved as the control
group if they had not been treated. The matches are made in order to ensure that both groups
10See Leuz et al. (2008)
9of observations have identical distributions along the covariates chosen. The matching procedure
used in this paper was suggested by Abadie and Imbens (2002).
This matching estimator allows to match each treated ﬁrm with one (or more than one) control
ﬁrm, for categorical and continuous variables. The estimator searchs exact matches on categorical
variables and the closest matches as possible for continuous variables. However, in ﬁnite sample,
when the matchis not exact the matching estimator will be biased. To correct the bias, we will
use the biased-corrected matching estimator that adjusts the diﬀerence within the matches for the
diﬀerence in their covariate values.11
In this procedure, the speciﬁcation instead of represents a model that try to fully explains
the endogenous variable, it focus on ensuring that variables that might inﬂuence the selection into
tratment and observed outcomes are appropriately accounted in the estimation. In our case, we are
interested in the terms of debt ﬁnancing. While there are several theories to justify the inclusion
of debt determinants, we only include in our estimations covariates that could make a reasonable
case for simultaneity in the treatment outcome relation. Among the list of variables used in our
matching estimators, we have: sector classiﬁcation; total assets; cash holdings; price-to-book ratio;
beta; accumulated proﬁt; ﬁxed assets and equity.
Finally, since we want to implement a matching diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimators, we model
t h eo u t c o m e si nad i ﬀerenced form. Therefore, we are comparing the changes in terms of debt
ﬁnancing accross the groups.
4 Descriptive Statistics
To proceed our empirical tests we use data from Economatica that contains balance-sheet infor-
mation on publicly traded Brazilian ﬁrms. Our sampling is composed by observations on 446
Brazilian Public Companies, where 34 use the American Depositary Shares (level II and III cross-
listed ﬁrms),12 from 1998 to 2006, disregarding observations from ﬁnancial institutions since their
ﬁnancial policy diﬀers strongly from the ﬁrms of the others sectors. We will call this subsample
of 34 ﬁrms that use the ADSs as treatment group, since they are subject to the changes brought
by the SOX. The rest of ﬁrms composed by those that are not listed or are listed at levels I or IV
ADRs will be called the control group.
We used ﬁscal-year-end ﬁrms’ information on their total assets, cash holdings, price-to-book
ratio, beta, accumulated proﬁt, ﬁxed assets, equity, amount of credit — short-term and long term —
and cost of credit. We consider as ﬁrm credit the balance sheet long-term and short-term debt plus
the accounts payable to suppliers. The cost of debt is calculated as total year’s interest expense
for each ﬁrm divided by its mean debt over the same period. The terms of credit variable (amount
and cost) are the interest variables, while the other accounting/ﬁnancial variables are used in the
matching procedure, together with the industry sector information.
To ensure the robustness of our results, we examine the distribution of our key variables. We
begin by removing all observations that appear to be misreported (such as negative numbers for
credit or zero assets).
Now we present some descriptive statistics about the median, concerning our covariates and
credit variables divided by group — treatment, non-treatment and control - before the SOX be
enacted. To avoid the ﬁrms’ size inﬂuence on the level of accounting variables (cash holdings,
equity, ﬁxed assets and accumulated proﬁts) we use the variables divided by the total assets.
Table 1 presents the median values of our covariates and terms of credit (diﬀerenced) for the
11For more details see Abadie et al. (2004).
12Information on Brazilian ﬁrms that are traded on NYSE and NASDAQ is obtained on www.adr.com
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ﬁrms composing our treatment group. Panel A compares the treatment group with all publicly
traded ﬁrms not aﬀected by SOX, representing the non-treatment group. Notice that for the pre-
SOX period, both groups have similar medians for terms of credit, unlike from the result observed
to the covariates, that present a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the treatment and non-treatment
medians. The treated ﬁrms are bigger, with higher price-to-book, risk (represented by beta), cash
holdings, equity, and ﬁxed assets. However, potential similiarities wasn‘t expected, since we are
not running a trully random experiment.
The beneﬁts brought by the matching estimators is to control for these distributional diﬀerences
that can aﬀect both the selection into the treatment group and the pos-SOX outcomes. We perform
again the same median test but comparing with a set of ﬁrms, called control group, identiﬁed by
the matching procedure from Abadie and Imbens (2002). In this case if two observations of the
o p p o s i t et r e a t m e n tg r o u pa r ee q u a l l yc l o s et ot h a tb e i n gm a t c h e d ,w ea l l o w e db o t ht ob eu s e d .
Observe in Panel B that there is no highly statistical diﬀerence between the control and the
treatment group for all the covariates. Except for the equity, that is signiﬁcant at 10%, all the
others are statistically diﬀerent.
 
Treatment Non-treatment P-value
var. total credit 0,22 0,12 0,240
var. cost of credit -0,01 -0,07 0,470
firm size 8329 728 0,000
price-to-book 1,50 0,60 0,000
beta 0,80 0,50 0,000
cash holdings 0,05 0,03 0,000
equity 0,43 0,35 0,000
fixed assets 0,51 0,40 0,000
accumulated profit 0,00 0,00 0,000
Treatment Control P-value
var. total credit 0,22 0,34 0,670
var. cost of credit -0,01 -0,05 0,060
firm size 8329 6074 0,110
price-to-book 1,50 1,20 0,290
beta 0,80 0,90 0,680
cash holdings 0,05 0,07 0,830
equity 0,43 0,48 0,060
fixed assets 0,51 0,61 0,830
accumulated profit 0,00 0,00 0,770
Tabela 1: Descriptive Statistics and median tests
Period berore the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2001)
Panel A: Treatment vs. Non-treatment
Panel B: Treatment vs. Control
It is also possible to go beyond the median comparison. Since we desire similarities in the
entire distribution, the next step should be compare the groups distribution. The results for the
entire distribution is very similar to the median test. Table 2 presents the results of Kolmogorov-
Smirnov distribution test comparing treatment agains non-treatment group and control group.
Again, when we compare the covariates distribution of treatment and non-treatment (ﬁrst column),
they presents statistical diﬀerences in their distribution, for all the covariates. Notice that this
huge diﬀerence gones when we compare the treatment group with the controul group provided via
matching, looking closely the the median results. This result indicates that there is no signiﬁcant
11diﬀerence between the covariates distribution when we are using the group of ﬁrms formed by
the matching procedure. This ﬁnding is aligned the idea that the matching estimator moves our
experiment closer to a true randomization in which treatment and control groups diﬀer only with




var. total credit 0.007 0.268
var. cost of credit 0.011 0.009
firm size 0.000 0.101
price-to-book 0.000 0.102
beta 0.000 0.769
cash holdings 0.000 0.168
equity 0.000 0.060
fixed assets 0.000 0.168
accumulated profit 0.000 0.268
Tabela 2: Distributional Tests
Period before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2001)
Distribution Kolmogorov-Smirnov: Treatment vs.
To illustrate the potential impact of SOX implementation, we compare the evolution in the
credit-assts ratio between ﬁrms in treatment group against all the other ﬁrms (non-treatment).
Figure 1, 2 and 3 shows a strong increase in the amount (mean and median) of total credit and
both long-term and short-term credit after the SOX become eﬀective only for the treatment group.
The annual mean and median of total credit to assets ratio increased from 0.36 to 0.40 for the
treatment group while a fall is observed for the control group, which means a variation of 11% and
-3% for the treatment and control group respectively. The results are qualitatively the same form
long-term and short-term credit to assets ratio. For the treatment group we observe an increase
of 22% and 29% in the mean and median long-term credit to assets ratio and 6% in the mean and
median short-term credit to assets ratio after the SOX, while the same variables remain constant
or even dropped for the control group.
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As illustrated in Figure 4, the annually average cost of credit presents a diﬀerent dynamics.
For the cost of credit, we observe a drop for both groups. The diﬀerence to be noticed is that the
drop in the treated group, in relative terms, was higher than for the non-treated group.
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To sum up, the descriptive statistics shows that after the Sarbanes-Oxley we observe for the
treatment group a strong increase in the amount of credit, diﬀerent from the non-treated group
where it remains stable or even dropped. For both groups we observe a similar behavior on the
cost of credit in absolute terms but a higher drop for treated ﬁrms in relative terms.
The diﬀerence in the terms of credit behavior between treated and non-treated gives us a nice
picture to illustrate the potential eﬀect of SOX, however we cannot forget that such results could
be driven for other factors that may inﬂuence the assignment into the "experiment" and the post-
SOX outcome. To estimate the SOX impact controlling for these facts, next section we present
our results using the matching diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimators.
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We now examine the ﬁrms’ debt ﬁnancing policy behavior, using information on amount of credit
(total, long term and short term) and its cost, comparing treated and control ﬁrms, before and
after the Sarbanes-Oxley implementation. Table 3 presents the results for the variable amount
of credit. Panels A, B and C report the SOX eﬀect estimation via matching procedure to total
amount of credit, short term credit and long term credit respectively. For total amount of credit
and long term credit we found a positive and highly signiﬁcant eﬀect of SOX on treated ﬁrms debt
ﬁnancing policy compared with our control ﬁrms. The ATT diﬀerence is equal to 1.10 and 1.61 for
total and long term credit respectively, which means that in percentage terms, the introduction of
SOX increases the ﬁrms debt ﬁnancing in approximately 1 0 %a n dt h el o n gt e r md e b tﬁnancing in
almost 40%. The eﬀect on short term credit wasn’t statistically signiﬁcant.




Matching Estimator (ATT) 1.10 0.229 0.000




Matching Estimator (ATT) 0.214 0.187 0.254




Matching Estimator (ATT) 1.61 0.290 0.000
Number of observations: 151
Painel C: Dependent Variable: difference of the log of long-term credit
Panel A: Dependent Variable: difference of the log of total credit
Painel B: Dependent Variable: difference of the log of short-term credit
This table presents the results of averagechange in total amount of credit,long
termcredit and short term credit (the amount of credit variables are in logs) from
2001 (pre-SOX year) to 2003 (post-SOX year) comparing treated and control
firms. The matching estimation measures the difference-in-difference between
the two groups of firms overs the years. The treated firms are defined as those
who are subjected to SOX (firms that are cross-listed on levels 2 or 3). The
control firms are the subset of non-treated firms selected as the closest match
(two firms at most) to the treated firms based on the covariates:total assets (in
logs), cash holdings, equity, fixed assets, industry sector, price-to-book ratio,
beta and accumulated profit. The ATT is the Abadie and Imbens average
treatment effect for the treated biased corrected matching estimator.
Heterokedasticity-consistent erros were used. 
Table 4 presents the results for the cost of credit variable. We ﬁnd a prominent reduction in the
cost of credit for the treatment ﬁrm comparing with the control ﬁrms. Notice that the reduction
i nt h ec o s to fc r e d i tw a sh i g h e rf o rt h eﬁrms that were aﬀected for the new law implementation.
The ATT diﬀerence is equal to 0.18, which means that the experiment made the interest rates
15decreases 18% more for the treated ﬁrms if compared to the control ﬁrms. This result directly
explained the previous result, since lower prices motivates a higher demand for credit and the debt
ﬁnancing.
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act had a positive
impact on terms of credit. Since the SOX brought better information, managers’ punishment and
monitoring, creditors may expect better corporate governance due to a reduction in managers’
moral hazard action (see propositions 1 and 2). This reduction of asymmetric information cost
increases the probability that ﬁrms succeed in their investment projects, diminishing the chance of
ﬁrms’ default. This eﬀect reduces the risk of lending, motivating creditors to supply more credit
at better terms.




Matching Estimator (ATT) -0.180 0.051 0.000
Number of observations: 150
This table presents the results of average change in the cost of credit from 2001 (pre-
SOX year) to 2003 (post-SOX year) comparing treated and controlfirms. The matching
estimationmeasures the difference-in-difference between thetwo groups of firms overs
the years. The treated firms are defined as those who aresubjected to SOX (firms that
are cross-listed on levels 2or 3). The control firms are the subset of non-treated firms
selected as the closest match (two firms at most) to the treated firms based on the
covariates: total assets (in logs), cash holdings, equity, fix ed assets, industry sector,
price-to-bookratio, beta and accumulated profit. The ATT is the Abadie and Imbens
average treatment effect for the treated biased corrected matching estimator.
Heterokedasticity-consistent erros were used. 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: difference of the cost of credit
Given the similarity between ﬁrms that compose both groups, theses evidences suggests a true
eﬀect of Sarbanes-Oxley Act on ﬁrms debt ﬁnancing policy. In order to verify that the result wasn’t
only drove by some unobservable characteristics that could predict an increase in amount of credit
and a decrease in its cost, we perform a placebo tests that replicates our matching estimators in
pre-reform period, from 1999 to 2001.




Matching Estimator (ATT) -0.176 0.151 0.241




Matching Estimator (ATT) 0.202 0.188 0.282




Matching Estimator (ATT) -0.367 0.366 0.317
Number of observations: 175
This table presents the placebo tests result of average change in total amount of
credit, long term credit and short term credit (the amount of credit variables are in
logs) from 1999 to 2001 comparing treated and control firms. The matching
estimation measures the difference-in-difference between the two groups of firms
overs the years. The treated firms are defined as those who are subjected to SOX
(firms that are cross-listed on levels 2 or3). Thecontrol firms are the subset ofnon-
treated firms selected as the closest match (two firms at most) to the treated firms
based on the covariates: total assets (in logs), cash holdings, equity, fixed assets,
industry sector, price-to-book ratio, beta and accumulated profit. The ATT is the
Abadie and Imbens average treatment effect for the treated biased corrected
matching estimator. Heterokedasticity-consistent erros were used. 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: difference of the log of total credit
Painel B: Dependent Variable: difference of the log of short-term credit
Painel C: Dependent Variable: difference of the log of long-term credit
The results of the placebo test are presented at tables 5 and 6. Panels A, B and C, from
table 5, present the matching diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation for the period before SOX. For all
three cases treated and control ﬁr m sh a v ev i r t u a l l yt h es a m eb e h a v i o ri nd e b tﬁnancing. The ATT
diﬀerences have no statistic signiﬁcance for total amount of credit, short term and long term. Table
6 shows that the same result of no statistic signiﬁcance of ATT happens with cost of credit variable.
Therefore, we can conclude that there is no diﬀerence in the terms of credit across the two groups
of ﬁrms in pre-treatment period. This result provide us more evidence that the improvement in
corporate governance schemes via SOX had a causal positive eﬀect on the terms of credit and on
ﬁrms debt ﬁnancing policy.




Matching Estimator (ATT) -0.180 0.051 0.000
Number of observations: 154
This table presents the placebo test results of average change in the cost of credit from
1999 to 2001 comparing treated and control firms. The matching estimation measures the
difference-in-difference between the two groups of firms overs the years.The treated firms
are defined as those who are subjected to SOX(firms that are cross-listed on levels 2 or3).
The control firms are the subset of non-treated firms selected as the closest match (two
firms at most) to the treated firms based on the covariates: total assets (in logs), cash
holdings, equity, fixed assets, industry sector, price-to-book ratio, beta and accumulated
profit. The ATT is the Abadie and Imbens average treatment effect for the treated biased
corrected matching estimator. Heterokedasticity-consistent erros were used. 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: difference of the cost of credit
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper uses the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to assess the eﬀect of changes at corporate governance
level on ﬁrms’ debt ﬁnancing policies to deal with the endogeneity problems. In particular, this
study tests whether ﬁrms subjected to a positive shock at the corporate governance level — brought
by this new regulation — observed more pronounced increase in their debt amount and reduction in
its cost than similar ﬁrms whose weren’t subjected to the new corporate governance level imposed
by SOX.
Our empirical approach aims at replicating an experiment like-design − using the Sarbanes
Oxley Act as an experiment − in which we control for observed and unobserved ﬁrms’ heterogene-
ity via the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence matching estimator.To implement such experiment we use an
environment that provides two diﬀerent sets of ﬁrms: the one that was aﬀected by SOX (called
treatment group) and another group that was not aﬀect by SOX (called control group). To reduce
the concerns about selection we match ﬁrms under SOX requirements (treatment), with control
ﬁr m st h a tw e r en o ts u b j e c t e dt ot h en e wr e g u l a t i o n . W em a t c ht h e s eg r o u p so fﬁrms based on
their ﬁnancial and accounting characteristics. The matching process is used to assure that we are
comparing very similar ﬁrms except from the fact that some of them are not subjected to SOX
regulation. Also, we account for time invariant ﬁrm heterogeneity since we compare within-ﬁrm
changes in the variable of interest, from the period that proceeds the reform to the period that
follows the reform.
Our main results show that the ﬁrms aﬀected by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act increase their total
amount of debt of approximately 10% percent more than similar ﬁr m st h a tw e r en o ta ﬀected by
SOX. Moreover, we found that both the long-term debt increase approximately 40%, while no eﬀect
was evidenced in the short-term debt. Finally, we found that the interest rate charged to ﬁrms
reduced approximately 18%, which is consistent to an expected reduction in moral hazard costs
due to the gains in corporate governance. Our results contributed to the literature in three ways.
First, our empirical strategy allow us to analyze the eﬀect of changes at corporate governance levels
on ﬁrms’ debt policy without the endogeneity problems; second, we evidence the positive eﬀect of
the SOX on ﬁrms access to credit market; and ﬁnally, we evidence the SOX eﬀect on cross-listed
foreign companies subjected to credit rationing.
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